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Abstract
We investigate the Multiplayer Multicommodity Flow Problem
(MMFP): several players have diﬀerent networks and commodities over a com-
mon node set. Pairs of players have contracts where one of them agrees to route
the ﬂow of the other player (up to a given capacity) between two speciﬁed nodes.
In return, the second player pays an amount proportional to the ﬂow value.
We show that the social optimum can be computed by linear programming,
and we propose algorithms based on column generation and Lagrangian relax-
ation. In contrast, we prove that it is hard to decide if an equilibrium solution
exists, although some natural conditions guarantee its existence.
1 Introduction
The Directed Multicommodity Flow Problem is a well-studied optimization
problem with extensive literature. The fractional version, which is relevant to the
topic of this paper, has a polynomial-size LP formulation and therefore it is solvable
in polynomial time. However, the simplex algorithm in itself is ineﬃcient due to the
large size of the LP, so several improvements and other algorithmic approaches have
been proposed, see e.g. [3, 6, 2]. Two general approaches that are applicable to this
problem are column generation, which was already proposed by Ford and Fulkerson
[5], and Lagrangian relaxation, which is used for example in [2].
In this paper we investigate a generalization of the multicommodity ﬂow problem
that we call the Multiplayer Multicommodity Flow Problem (MMFP). It
involves several players, each having diﬀerent networks and commodities over a com-
mon node set. The input includes contracts between pairs of players; each contract
obliges one player to route the ﬂow of the other player between two speciﬁed nodes
(up to a given capacity). In return, the other player pays an amount proportional to
the ﬂow value. We also allow a multiplier applied to the amount of ﬂow to be routed
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by the second player, which may model e.g. the increase of data size due to conversion
between networks.
Multiplayer ﬂows have already been studied in the literature in the context of
cooperative games, but the usual setting is to have a single network where each player
owns a subset of the arcs, and other players are allowed to buy a fraction of the arc
capacity [4, 1]. Our network model is more general in the sense that players can
choose how to route demands generated by contracts with other players.
The ﬂow multipliers associated with the contracts add another layer of generaliza-
tion that is subtle in the sense that the interpretation of feasible solutions in terms of
actual transportation of commodities becomes tricky. We show in Section 2 that such
an interpretation is always possible if the ﬂow multipliers are at least 1, using the
notion of realization of a path which corresponds naturally to the transportation of
a commodity. In contrast, multipliers smaller than 1 may result in feasible solutions
that do not have such an interpretation.
In the rest of the current section we give the necessary deﬁnitions, including the
notion of social optimum, safe instance and equilibrium solution. It is shown in Section
2 that the problem of ﬁnding a social optimum can be solved in polynomial time using
linear programming, and we give a common sense interpretation of feasible solutions
in terms of realizations of paths and acyclic solutions. The aim of Section 3 is to extend
the column generation and Lagrangian relaxation methods for multicommodity ﬂows
to MMFP. In Section 4, we prove using the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem that an
equilibrium solution always exists in a safe instance, while in general it is NP-complete
to decide its existence.
1.1 Deﬁnitions and notation
Given a set of players I, each player has a digraph Di = (V,Ai) (with disjoint arc
sets) with costs c : ∪i∈IAi → R+, capacities u : ∪i∈IAi → R+, and normal demands:
a ﬂow of size dij has to be sent from s
i
j to t
i
j (j ∈ J i). There is a subset of arcs Bi ⊆ Ai
called contractual arcs, where the player has a contract with another player requiring
the other player to route the ﬂow between the two endnodes of the arc in her own
network for a speciﬁed price (proportional to the amount of ﬂow). The arcs in Ai \Bi
are called normal arcs. Let A = ∪i∈IAi and B = ∪i∈IBi.
The following additional values are given for each contractual arc a ∈ Bi. ia is the
player that has to route the ﬂow going through a. fa : [0, ua] → R+ is a continuous
monotone increasing function that gives the amount of ﬂow to be routed, i.e. if the
ﬂow value of a = uv is x, then player ia has to route a ﬂow of size fa(x) from u to
v. This function may model the increase of data size due to the conversion between
networks. Usually we will consider the linear case fa(x) = dax. We always assume
that da ≥ 1 (or, in general fa(x) ≥ x for any x ∈ R+) holds for every a ∈ B. The
resulting demand in the network of ia is called a contractual demand for player ia.
The identiﬁer of this demand is ka. Let Ki be the set of identiﬁers of the contractual
demands for player i; then ka ∈ Kia for a ∈ Bi. We assume that all the identiﬁer sets
J i, Ki(i ∈ I) are disjoint and let J = ∪i∈IJ i and K = ∪i∈IKi. Note that a 7→ ka is a
bijection between B and K.
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A contractual arc a has a contract price, denoted by pa. If the ﬂow value of a = uv
is x, then player i has to pay pax to player ia in exchange for sending the ﬂow.
It may seem confusing at ﬁrst that a contractual arc has both a contract price pa
and a cost ca. A possible interpretation is that the contract price determines the
payment to another player, while the cost of a contractual arc represents the cost of
transferring the ﬂow to another network. We do not make any restrictions on the
costs, but it is probably a natural assumption that costs of contractual arcs are much
lower than costs of normal arcs.
1.2 Feasible and equilibrium solutions
In a feasible solution each player has a multicommodity ﬂow (one commodity for every
j ∈ J i ∪ Ki) that satisﬁes all normal and contractual demands. Note that here the
contractual demands depend on the multicommodity ﬂows of the other players.
A social optimum solution is a feasible solution which is optimal for the cost function
c. The contract prices play no role in this deﬁnition.
Let us motivate the assumption da ≥ 1 (a ∈ B). Consider the following two-player
example where V = {s, t}. Let A1 = B1 = {a = st} and A2 = B2 = {b = st} (i.e.
both players have a contract with the other) and the only normal demand is for player
1 who has to ship 1 unit from s to t (i.e. let J1 = {j1} with these parameters and
let J2 = ∅). Let the capacities be given as ua = 2 and ub = 1 and the multipliers as
da = 1/2 and db = 1. The following is a feasible solution: the ﬁrst player ships 2 units
from s to t on arc a which is the sum of two ﬂows xj1 (satisfying the normal demand
j1 ∈ J1) and xkb (satisfying the contractual demand kb to be described later). The
ﬂow on arc a induces a contractual demand of value 1 for player 2, since da = 1/2,
which is shipped on arc b, i.e. xka(b) = 1. This in turn generates a contractual
demand of value 1 for player 1 (since db = 1). Clearly, this is a feasible solution
of the problem, although from a practical point of view it does not make sense (for
example this solution does not have a physical routing). This example shows that the
assumption da ≥ 1 (or, in general fa(x) ≥ x for any a ∈ B and x ∈ R+) is indeed
natural.
We say that an instance of MMFP is a safe instance if each player i has a feasible
solution for the standard multicommodity ﬂow problem in Di (including the arcs in
Bi!) for all her normal demands plus all her contractual demands set at their maximum
(for a contractual arc a = uv, the maximal contractual demand for player ia is f(ua)
from u to v).
An equilibrium solution is a feasible solution which is a minimum cost multicom-
modity ﬂow restricted to each player's network for the player's normal and contractual
demands induced by the solution. Here the cost of arc a ∈ Ai \Bi is ca, while the cost
of arc a ∈ Bi is ca + pa. It may seem strange that we do not consider the contract
prices that a player receives; this is because these received payments depend only on
the multicommodity ﬂows of the other players, so they are irrelevant to whether a
player's multicommodity ﬂow is minimum cost or not in her own network, since they
add a constant to the cost if the ﬂows of the other players are ﬁxed.
It is important to note that this notion of equilibrium is stronger than the usual
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Nash-equilibrium, because here in an equilibrium state players are unable to improve
their objective even with strategy changes that render the whole solution infeasible.
2 LP formulation and interpretation
2.1 LP formulation
In case of fa(x) = dax, there are two main LP models for ﬁnding the social optimum:
the arc-ﬂow and the path-ﬂow formulations. The ﬁrst one can be written as follows.
min
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈Ai
ca
∑
j∈Ji
xja +
∑
k∈Ki
xka
 (1)
∑
j∈Ji
xja +
∑
k∈Ki
xka ≤ ua ∀a ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ I, (2)
N ixj = dijδ
j ∀j ∈ J i, ∀i ∈ I, (3)
N iaxka = da
∑
j∈Ji
xja +
∑
k∈Ki
xka
 δa ∀a ∈ Bi, ∀i ∈ I, (4)
xja ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ Ai, j ∈ J i, ∀i ∈ I, (5)
xka ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ Ai, k ∈ Ki, ∀i ∈ I. (6)
Here, N i is the network matrix of the ith player, δj is a vector with only two non-zero
components: −1 at the supply node and 1 at the demand node. Similarly, δa is a
vector with only two non-zero components: −1 at the tail and 1 at the head of the
arc a. The variable xj is the ﬂow of commodity j ∈ J i on the arcs of the network of
the ith player. The variable xk is the ﬂow of contractual commodity k ∈ Ki on the
arcs of the network of the ith player.
The path-ﬂow formulation of the problem requires some additional notation. Let
P ij denote the set of paths in Di from the source to the sink of the jth commodity
of player i. Similarly, P ik denotes the set of paths in Di from the source to the sink
of the kth contractual commodity of player i. We assume that if there is more than
one (normal or contractual) demand in Di between s and t for a certain pair s, t ∈ V ,
then for each demand there is a separate P ij (j ∈ J i ∪Ki) that contains all s-t paths
in Di. Let P i = ∪j∈JiP ij
⋃∪k∈KiP ik and P = ∪i∈IP i. The corresponding LP problem
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is
min
∑
P∈P
c(P )xP (7)
x ∈ RP (8)
x ≥ 0 (9)∑
P∈Pi:a∈P
xP ≤ ua ∀a ∈ Ai, i ∈ I, (10)∑
P∈Pij
xP ≥ dij ∀j ∈ J i, i ∈ I, (11)
∑
P∈Piaka
xP ≥ da
( ∑
P∈Pi:a∈P
xP
)
∀a ∈ Bi, i ∈ I. (12)
The variable xP , P ∈ P ij (P ∈ P ik) belongs to the ﬂow of (contractual) commodity j
(k) on the path P , and c(P ) =
∑
a∈P ca.
The correspondence between the solutions of (2)-(6) and the solutions of (8)-(12)
is the following. If xl (l ∈ J ∪K) is a solution of (2)-(6), then we can take a path-
decomposition of every ﬂow xl (leaving out the possible cycles) and get a solution
of (8)-(12). On the other hand, if xP (P ∈ P) is a solution of (8)-(12), then xl =∑
P∈Pil xP for every i ∈ I and l ∈ J
i ∪Ki gives a solution of (2)-(6).
2.2 Interpretation of feasible solutions
We assume da ≥ 1 for all contractual arcs a ∈ Bi, hence fa(x) ≥ x for all a ∈
Bi, x ∈ [0, ua]. In this section we consider the path representation of the MMFP,
using the notation P ,P i,P ij of the previous subsection. Our aim is to formalize the
intuitive notion that the commodities corresponding to normal demands are actually
transferred to their destination with a ﬁnite number of transfers between networks of
diﬀerent players.
A feasible solution in the path representation is given by a vector x ∈ RP+ that
satisﬁes the constraints (10)-(12). Intuitively, a solution of this system amounts to
a physical routing along paths, in which we satisfy a portion of the jth demand of
the ith player by a certain path P1 ∈ P ij. However, if P1 contains a contractual arc
a, then the corresponding contractual demand is satisﬁed by another path P2 ∈ P iaka ,
and so on. P1 may contain several contractual arcs, thus we may need paths other
than P2 to satisfy contractual demands generated by P1. Then again, P2, and all
the other paths will generate further contractual demands that have to be satisﬁed.
Thus we may iteratively generate further contractual demands, with no end in sight.
Even worse, the number of contractual demands may increase with every iteration,
and also we could run into an inﬁnite loop. This we have to avoid by all means if we
want to demonstrate that a solution to the MMFP gives a realizable routing of the
normal demands. Further, this motivates the following deﬁnition, which essentially
formulates the ﬁnite realization of a path. We say that a path P ∈ P i is a normal
path if it contains only normal arcs.
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Player 1 Player 3Player 2
b
a ka
kb
kc
Figure 1: A path whose realization cannot be represented by an arborescence. Black
denotes normal and red denotes contractual; a solid line is an arc while a dotted line
is a demand. In the unique realization of the path ab, the sink, which corresponds to
the single-arc path in the network of player 3, has in-degree 2.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Let P ∈ P be arbitrary. We give a recursive deﬁnition of a digraph
(R,F ) with R ⊆ P : start with R = {P} and F = ∅, and in every step choose a
node Q ∈ R that is not a normal path and has out-degree zero in (R,F ). For every
contractual arc a ∈ Q choose an (arbitrary) path Qa ∈ P iaka and add it to R (if it
was not already in it) and include the arc QQa in F , too. Clearly, the construction is
ﬁnite. Thus the out-degree of any node Q in (R,F ) equals the number of contractual
arcs in Q. If (R,F ) is acyclic, then we say that it is a realization of P (a path P
might have many diﬀerent realizations).
We are only interested in realization of paths P ∈ P ij for j ∈ J i. The set of realized
paths is denoted by R. Let Rij denote the set of realized paths that realize a path in
P ij for an i ∈ I, j ∈ J i, and also let Ri := ∪j∈JiRij for any i ∈ I.
If (R,F ) is a realization of P , then let d(R,F ) : R → R+ denote the ﬂow values
needed to realize the path P at the root, which is deﬁned as follows: d(R,F )(P ) := 1,
and if Q ∈ R ∩ P iaka for some a ∈ B, then d(R,F )(Q) := da
∑t
j=1 d(R,F )(Qj) where
Q1, Q2, . . . , Qt are the parents of Q in (R,F ).
One might think that the above deﬁnition is more laborious than necessary: a
realized path could simply be an arborescence (R,F ) with R ⊆ P . However, the
example in Figure 1 shows that we cannot make this assumption.
To interpret this deﬁnition in terms of shipping of commodities, consider a realized
path (R,F ) such that P ∈ P is the root in (R,F ). Assume we want to ship one
unit of the commodity from the ﬁrst node of P to the last node of P . We may do
this, of course, via P if it only uses normal arcs, and in this case (R,F ) is a single
node. Otherwise P may contain a number of contractual arcs, which may be realized
by the children of P in (R,F ). This, by constraint (12), requires the shipping of da
units of the contractual commodity ka by contractor ia. Thus when we encounter a
contractual arc a in P ∩ P ij, we satisfy the contractual demand generated by arc a
using the unique child Q of P with Q ∈ P iaka . Note that we need to make |F | such
calls in total, since (R,F ) is acyclic.
Given a solution x ∈ RP+ of (10)-(12), a realization of x, i.e. a realization of a feasible
EGRES Technical Report No. 2012-09
2.2 Interpretation of feasible solutions 7
solution is given by a non-negative vector y ∈ RR+ that satisﬁes
∑
(R,F )∈R:P∈R
y(R,F )d(R,F )(P ) ≤ xP ∀P ∈ P (13)∑
(R,F )∈Rij
y(R,F ) ≥ dij ∀j ∈ J i, i ∈ I. (14)
A solution y of this system means that a realized path (R,F ) is used at throughput
y(R,F ) in our realized routing. By the ﬁrst constraint we make sure that y comes from
a realization of x, and by the second constraint we satisfy all the demands.
In order to demonstrate that the model of MMFP is meaningful, we should show
that feasible solutions can be realized with a routing of normal commodities using
realization of paths, as deﬁned above. The following Lemma is a formal statement of
this claim.
Lemma 2.2. Given a solution x ∈ RP+ of (10)-(12), there is a solution y of (13)-(14).
Also, given x one can determine a solution y of (13)-(14) in polynomial time.
In order to prove this lemma we deﬁne acyclic solutions.
2.2.1 Acyclic solutions
Deﬁnition 2.3. A feasible solution x of (2)-(6) is an acyclic solution if there is a
linear order ≺ on J ∪K such that if l ∈ J ∪K, xl(a) > 0, and a is a contractual arc,
then l ≺ ka. Similarly, a feasible solution of (8)-(12) is an acyclic solution if there is
a linear order ≺ of supp(x) such that for any P ∈ supp(x) and any contractual arc
a ∈ P ∩B we have P ≺ P ′ for every P ′ ∈ P iaka ∩ supp(x).
Deﬁnition 2.4. For a feasible solution x of (8)-(12) we deﬁne the following edge-
weighted directed graph Dx. The node set of Dx is J ∪K ∪ supp(x). The nodes in
supp(x) have in-degree 1: the only arc entering a path P ∈ supp(x) ∩ P il comes from
node l (where i ∈ I and l ∈ J i∪Ki) and this arc has weight xP . The arcs leaving this
path P go to the nodes ka ∈ K for every a ∈ P ∩B (i.e. the out-degree of P is zero if
and only if P is a normal path) and these arcs have weight daxP . Note that if l ∈ J
then l is not the head of any arc, and the digraph Dx is bipartite with color classes
J ∪K and supp(x). Observe that x is acyclic if and only if this digraph is acyclic.
Proposition 2.5. If x is a feasible solution of (8)-(12), then there is an acyclic
solution x∗ such that x∗ ≤ x.
Proof. Suppose indirectly that the nodes P1, ka1 , P2, ka2 , . . . , Pm, kam form a cycle in
Dx (in this order). Let x′ := x− 
∑m
i=1 χ{Pi} with  maximum to maintain the non-
negativity of x′. We claim that x′ is a feasible solution of (8)-(12). Clearly, (8)-(10)
holds for x′ too, since 0 ≤ x′ ≤ x. (11) follows from the fact that x′|Pij = x|Pij for
every i ∈ I and j ∈ J i, since a cycle does not contain nodes in J . Note that (12)
states that at any node ka ∈ K, the sum of the weights of the arcs leaving the node
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ka is at least the sum of the weights entering this node. Observe that Dx′ can be
obtained from Dx by appropriately decreasing the weights of every arc entering or
leaving the nodes P1, P2, . . . , Pm (and deleting the nodes in supp(x) − supp(x′)). If
ka is not in our cycle for some a ∈ B, then the weight of the arcs leaving ka did not
decrease (while the weight of those entering ka might have decreased), therefore (12)
also holds for x′ and a. On the other hand, if ka is in the cycle for some a ∈ B, then
the weight of exactly one arc leaving ka decreased by  and at least one arc entering
ka has had its weight decreased by da. Since da ≥ 1, this shows that (12) also holds
for x′ and a. Thus indeed x′ is a solution to (8)-(12).
Since supp(x′) ( supp(x), by induction on supp(x) there is an acyclic solution
x∗ ≤ x′ ≤ x, proving the claim. It is also clear that this solution x∗ can be found in
polynomial time.
Corollary 2.6. The social optimum is always achieved by an acyclic solution.
Proposition 2.7. An acyclic solution can be decomposed into realized paths.
Proof. Suppose that x is a counterexample with |supp(x)|+∑i |J i|minimal. Consider
the digraph Dx and choose an arbitrary node j ∈ J i (where i ∈ I) and an arbitrary
path P ∈ P ij. A realization (R,F ) of P can be deﬁned the following way: in every step
the successors of a node Q should be chosen from supp(x) (equivalently, this could be
obtained from a subgraph of Dx by a suitable contraction). Since x is feasible, this can
be done, and since x is acyclic, this will indeed give a realization of P . Then we deﬁne
x′P := xP−d(R,F )(P ) if P ∈ R, and x′P := xP if P /∈ R, and d′ij := dij−, and d′ef := def
for (e, f) 6= (i, j). Choose  to be maximal such that d′ and x′ remain non-negative.
We remove j from J i if d′ij becomes zero. Then x
′, d′ is not a counterexample because
of the minimality of x, hence there is a solution y′ of (13)-(14) with respect to x′, d′.
Consequently, y := y′ + χ(R,F ) is a solution of (13)-(14) with respect to x, d.
Remark. The proof also applies to the case when the functions fa are nonlinear,
provided that fa(x) ≥ x for every a and x. In this case (12) can be nonlinear, i.e.,∑
P∈Piaka
xP ≥ fa
( ∑
P∈Pi:a∈P
xP
)
∀a ∈ Bi, i ∈ I.
Of course, we need restrictions on the functions fa in order to be able to compute a
realization in polynomial time as in Lemma 2.2.
Remark. The analogue of Corollary 2.6 for equilibria is not true: it is possible
that there are equilibrium solutions but none of them is acyclic.
Remark. In case of da < 1, simple (and safe) counterexamples to Lemma 2.2 (in
fact, to Claim 2.5) exist. Such an example was given in Subsection 1.2.
3 Calculating the social optimum
Our aim in this section is to ﬁnd the social optimum: a feasible solution that is optimal
for the cost function c. We have seen that this can be written as an LP of polynomial
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size, so it can be solved in polynomial time. In practice, the running time can be
dramatically reduced by the use of suitable solution methods: column generation
and Lagrangian relaxation. This section introduces the solution algorithms suited to
MMFP.
3.1 Column generation
In the following, we describe a column generation method based on the method of Ford
and Fulkerson [5] to solve the problem. Let problem (7)-(12) be called the master LP.
The column generation method takes a subset of paths, and solves the LP restricted to
the variables corresponding to those paths. Then it checks whether the dual solution
obtained is feasible for the master LP. If it is, then the primal solution is optimal for
the master LP. If it is not, we can ﬁnd a variable for which the corresponding dual
inequality is violated, and we can add this variable to the restricted LP.
The crucial question is how to ﬁnd a dual inequality that is violated, since there
are exponentially many inequalities. We show that in our problem it is easy. First we
describe the dual problem.
max
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
dijz
i
j −
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈Ai
uaya (15)
y ∈ R
∑
i∈I |Ai| (16)
z ∈ R
∑
i∈I |Ji|+
∑
i∈I |Bi| (17)
y, z ≥ 0 (18)
zij −
∑
a∈(Ai\Bi)∩P
ya −
∑
a∈Bi∩P
(ya + daz
i
a) ≤ c(P ) ∀P ∈ P ij, j ∈ J i,
∀i ∈ I, (19)
zia −
∑
a′∈(Aia\Bia )∩P
ya′ −
∑
a′∈Bia∩P
(ya′ + da′z
ia
a′ ) ≤ c(P ) ∀P ∈ P iaka , a ∈ Bi,
∀i ∈ I. (20)
Suppose that we have a dual vector (y∗, z∗), and we want to decide if it is feasible,
so we have to check inequalities (19) and (20). In order to ﬁnd a path P ∈ P ij
that violates (19), we have to ﬁnd the shortest path from the source to the sink of
the commodity j ∈ J i relative to the non-negative length function la = y∗a + ca for
a ∈ Ai\Bi and la = y∗a + dazi∗a + ca for a ∈ Bi. If the length of the shortest path is
less than zi∗j , then we have found a path for which (19) is violated, otherwise there is
no such path in P ij.
For P ∈ P iaka , we have to solve a similar problem with length function la′ = y∗a′ + ca′
for a′ ∈ Aia\Bia and la′ = y∗a′ + da′zia∗a′ + ca′ for a′ ∈ Bia . To sum up, we can test the
feasibility of (y∗, z∗) by running the Dijkstra algorithm |J |+ |K| times.
EGRES Technical Report No. 2012-09
3.2 Lagrangian relaxation 10
3.2 Lagrangian relaxation
Consider the arc-ﬂow formulation. Let us relax the capacity constraints (2) and assign
to them the dual variable vector y ≥ 0. The Lagrangian dual problem is
max
y≥0
L(y),
where L(y) is deﬁned as the optimum of
min L(x, y) (21)
N ixj = dijδ
j ∀j ∈ J i, ∀i ∈ I, (22)
N iaxka = da
∑
j∈Ji
xja +
∑
k∈Ki
xka
 δa ∀a ∈ Bi, ∀i ∈ I, (23)
xj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J i, ∀i ∈ I, (24)
xka ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ Ki, ∀i ∈ I, (25)
and L(x, y) is the Lagrangian function
L(x, y) =
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈Ai
ca
∑
j∈Ji
xja +
∑
k∈Ki
xka
+∑
i∈I
∑
a∈Ai
ya
∑
j∈Ji
xja +
∑
k∈Ki
xka − ua
 .
Because the Lagrangian dual is the minimum of linear forms in y, it is concave.
Moreover, it is possible to exhibit an element of the anti-subgradient at y¯ if we know
an optimal solution x¯ of (21)-(25) at y¯. Indeed, for any y, we have from the deﬁnition
of L,
L(y) ≤
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈Ai
ca
∑
j∈Ji
x¯ja +
∑
k∈Ki
x¯ka
+∑
i∈I
∑
a∈Ai
ya
∑
j∈Ji
x¯ja +
∑
k∈Ki
x¯ka − ua
 . (26)
Inequality (26) clearly shows that −u+ x¯j + x¯k is an anti-subgradient. Inequality (26)
is sometimes referred to as an optimality cut for L.
The Lagrangian function can be converted into the following form:
L(x, y) = −
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈Ai
yaua +
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈Ai
(ca + ya)
∑
j∈Ji
xja +
∑
k∈Ki
xka
 .
Hence, for any y ≥ 0, problem (21)-(25) can be considered as an MMFP on the same
Di = (V,Ai), i ∈ I, with costs ca + ya, a ∈ ∪i∈IAi and without capacity constraints
(i.e. ua = +∞, a ∈ ∪i∈IAi).
The solution of the MMFP without capacity constraints can be carried out in the
following way. It is easy to see that without contractual arcs, problem (21)-(25) is
separable into shortest-path problems from the source to the sink of the commodity
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j in J i relative to the non-negative length function la = ca + ya for a ∈ Ai, i ∈ I. In
case of the existence of contractual arcs two kinds of demands have to be considered:
the normal and the contractual. However, Lemma 2.2 says that there are normal
realizations behind the contractual arcs. Hence, if we know the minimal cost of a
realization of one unit of ﬂow on a contractual arc a ∈ Bi (let us denote it by na),
then problem (21)-(25) can be considered as shortest-path problems from the source
to the sink of the commodity j in J i relative to the non-negative length function
la = ca + ya for a ∈ Ai\Bi and la = ca + ya + na for a ∈ Bi, i ∈ I. In order to ﬁnd na
for all a ∈ ∪i∈IBi we apply the following
Dynamic programming algorithm to ﬁnd the minimal cost of a realization
of one unit of ﬂow on a contractual arc
Step 0. Let na(0) = +∞ for all a ∈ ∪i∈IBi. Let k = 0.
Step 1. Let na(k + 1) = min(na(k), dal(Pa(k))) for all a ∈ ∪i∈IBi, where l(Pa(k)) is
the length of the shortest path between the tail and head of a in Dia = (V,Aia) with
arc-lengths la = ca + ya for a ∈ Aia\Bia and la = ca + ya + na(k) for a ∈ Bia .
Step 2. If na(k + 1) = na(k) for all a ∈ ∪i∈IBi then STOP. Else k ← k + 1 GOTO
Step 1.
Theorem 3.1. The algorithm stops within at most
∑
i∈I |Bi|+ 1 iterations.
Proof. Corollary of Lemma 2.2.
By the use of the above method the values as well as the anti-subgardients of the
concave function L(y) can be calculated. Hence, several algorithms exist to ﬁnd the
maximum of it. For example, the the analytic center cutting-plane method (ACCPM)
of [7] can be applied.
As a consequence, we can solve MMFP using slight modiﬁcations of multicommod-
ity ﬂow algorithms based on Lagrangian relaxation. In particular, the algorithm of [2],
which uses partial Lagrangian relaxation with proximal-ACCPM (see [9]) can be eas-
ily converted into an algorithm for MMFP, the only diﬀerence being the computation
of L(y), as detailed above.
4 Results on equilibria
Equilibrium solutions, deﬁned in Subsection 1.2, are solutions where no player has the
intention to change the routing in his network. In this section we show that in general
it is NP-complete to decide if an equilibrium solution exists, while in safe instances
there always exists one. However, even in safe instances the social cost of equilibria
can be arbitrarily high, and it is NP-complete to decide if there is one with social cost
smaller than C.
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4.1 Existence of equilibrium solutions
In this subsection we show that an equilibrium solution always exists in a safe in-
stance, even under the very weak assumption that the functions fa are continuous
and monotone increasing.
Theorem 4.1. In a safe instance of the problem there is always an equilibrium solu-
tion.
Proof. As before, let A be the set of all arcs, B the set of all contractual arcs, and let
Q = ×a∈B[0, ua],
i.e. Q is the space of all possible ﬂow values on contractual arcs. Q is a compact
convex set in RB. Since contractual demands are determined by the ﬂow values on
contractual arcs, we can associate to an element x ∈ Q a set of all (contractual plus
normal) demands Dem(x).
We deﬁne a set-valued function φ : Q → P(Q) the following way. For x ∈ Q,
we consider the demands Dem(x), and take the direct sum of the polyhedra of all
minimum cost multicommodity ﬂows (w.r.t. cost function c for normal arcs and c+ p
for contractual arcs) for each player. Let φ(x) be the projection of this polyhedron
to the coordinates corresponding to contractual arcs. In other words, φ(x) contains
all vectors on B that arise as arc values of minimum cost multicommodity ﬂows for
demands Dem(x).
It is clear that φ(x) is closed and convex for every x, since it is a polyhedron. We
show that φ is upper semi-continuous, i.e. its graph is closed. Let xi ∈ Q (i ∈ N) be
a convergent sequence, xi → x ∈ Q. Let furthermore yi ∈ φ(xi) (i ∈ N) such that
yi → y ∈ Q. For yi, let yi ∈ RA be a minimum cost multicommodity ﬂow for demands
Dem(xi) whose restriction to B is yi. By the standard argument, we can select a
subsequence i1, i2, . . . so that yij(a) is convergent for every a ∈ A; let y denote the
limit. Since the functions fa (a ∈ B) are continuous and the multicommodity ﬂow
problem is linear, y is a minimum cost multicommodity ﬂow for demands Dem(x).
This proves that y ∈ φ(x).
By Kakutani's ﬁxed point theorem [8], there is an element x∗ ∈ Q such that
x∗ ∈ φ(x∗). This means that for demands Dem(x∗), there are minimum cost mul-
ticommodity ﬂows for each player with contractual arc values equal to x∗. This
corresponds to an equilibrium solution.
4.2 NP-completeness
Let us deﬁne an auxiliary directed graph D∗ = (I, A∗) on the set of players. There
is an arc from i to ia for each contractual arc a ∈ B. We allow parallel arcs, so
|A∗| = |B|. We say that the contracts are acyclic if D∗ is acyclic.
We know that in a safe instance there is always an equilibrium solution. In contrast,
the following result shows that for non-safe instances it is hard to decide if there is
an equilibrium.
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Theorem 4.2. In general it is NP-compete to decide whether there is an equilibrium
solution. This holds even if the contracts are acyclic and the instance is almost safe
in the sense that there is only one contractual demand that cannot be routed.
Proof. We reduce SAT to this problem. Suppose there are m clauses and n variables
x1, x2, . . . , xn. We construct an instance with n+ 2 players: the ﬁrst n players corre-
spond to variables, the network of the (n + 1)-th player models the clauses, and the
(n + 2)-th player is a dummy player with no arcs in his network. We show that the
instance has an equilibrium solution if and only if the SAT instance is satisﬁable.
The j-th player (j = 1, . . . , n) has a normal demand of one unit from uj to vj and
his network contains two disjoint paths from uj to vj, one corresponding to xj, the
other to xj. These paths contain several contractual arcs: one for each clause in which
xj (resp. xj) appears. The contractor for these arcs is the (n+ 1)-th player. All costs
are 0 and all capacities are 1.
The (n+ 1)-th player has m normal demands of one unit, one for each clause. The
i-th demand is from si to ti, and there is a normal arc from si to ti with high cost
and unit capacity. In addition, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} there is a path from si to ti
with cost 0 and unit capacity, and these paths share a single arc st (but apart from
the nodes s and t they are node-disjoint). The arc st is a contractual arc with the
(n + 2)-th player, who has no s − t path in his network, so this contract cannot be
realized.
All the contractual demands of the (n + 1)-th player lie on these paths: for all
literals in clause i, the contractual demands corresponding to the literals cover disjoint
sections of the path (not containing st).
In an equilibrium solution, the (n+ 1)-th player must route his normal demands on
the high-cost si− ti arcs, because the low-cost paths contain an unrealizable contract.
By the deﬁnition of equilibrium, he must have a minimum cost multicommodity ﬂow
in his network, which means that all the low cost paths must contain an arc saturated
by the ﬂow corresponding to a contractual demand, i.e. there must be a contractual
demand of value 1 on each low cost path. This means that the ﬂows of the ﬁrst n
players must be paths that correspond to an evaluation that satisﬁes every clause.
To see the other direction, consider an evaluation that satisﬁes every clause. This
deﬁnes an equilibrium solution the following way. The j-th player (j = 1, . . . , n) routes
his normal demand on the path corresponding to xj if xj is true in the evaluation,
and on the path corresponding to xj if it is false. The (n + 1)-th player routes his
normal demands on the high-cost si − ti arcs. It can be seen by the same argument
as above that this is an equilibrium solution.
Remark. A similar proof shows that in a safe instance it is NP-complete to decide
if there is an equilibrium solution with social cost smaller than C, even if the contracts
are acyclic. The only modiﬁcation is that the high cost in the construction above
should be small compared to C, and a normal arc st of cost C and capacity m should
be added to the network of the (n+ 2)-th player.
EGRES Technical Report No. 2012-09
References 14
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by France Telecom through a research contract between
France Telecom Research & Development (scientist in charge: Alexandre Laugier)
and ELTE (scientist in charge: András Frank).
References
[1] R. Agarwal and Ö. Ergun, Mechanism design for a multicommodity ﬂow game in
service network alliances, Operations Research Letters 36 (2008), 520524.
[2] F. Babonneau, O. du Merle and J-P. Vial, Solving Large-Scale Linear Multicom-
modity Flow Problems with an Active Set Strategy and Proximal-ACCPM, Oper.
Res. 54(1) (2006), 184197.
[3] A. Bompadre and J.B. Orlin, A simple method for improving the primal simplex
method for the multicommodity ﬂow problem, Networks 51 (2008), 6377.
[4] J.J.M. Derks and S.H. Tijs, Stable outcomes for multicommodity ﬂow games, Meth-
ods of Operations Research, 50 (1985), 493504.
[5] L.R. Ford, jr. and D.R. Fulkerson, A suggested computation for maximal multi-
commodity network ﬂows, Manage. Sci. 5 (1958), 97101.
[6] N. Garg and J. Könemann, Faster and Simpler Algorithms for Multicommodity
Flow and Other Fractional Packing Problems, SIAM J. Comput. 37 (2007), 630
652.
[7] J.-L. Goﬃn, A. Haurie and J.-P. Vial, Decomposition and nondiﬀerentiable opti-
mization with the projective algorithm, Management Sci. 38(2) (1992), 284302.
[8] S. Kakutani, A generalization of Brouwer's ﬁxed point theorem, Duke Math. J. 8
(1941), 457459.
[9] O. du Merle and J.-P. Vial, Proximal ACCPM, a cutting plane method for col-
umn generation and Lagrangian relaxation: Application to the p-median problem,
Technical report, Logilab, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland, 2002.
EGRES Technical Report No. 2012-09
